Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats

The strategic interaction between authentic luxury brands and their copycats has evolved since the proliferation of online marketplaces. Using a game-theoretic framework, we examine how an authentic luxury brand, observing the strategic behavior of its competing copycats, should make its optimal ent...

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Main Authors: GAO, Sarah Yini, LIM, Wei Shi, YE, Ziqiu
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2022
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7151
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8150/viewcontent/SSRN_id4289205.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-81502023-01-20T02:53:35Z Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats GAO, Sarah Yini LIM, Wei Shi YE, Ziqiu The strategic interaction between authentic luxury brands and their copycats has evolved since the proliferation of online marketplaces. Using a game-theoretic framework, we examine how an authentic luxury brand, observing the strategic behavior of its competing copycats, should make its optimal entry decision to a third-party online marketplace. Our findings reveal that the authentic luxury brand does not sell on the online marketplace when either the quality or the physical resemblance of the copycat to the authentic luxury brand is high. This contributes to the related literature by offering an explanation for the increasing quality of copycats amid the e-commerce boom —improving the quality of the copycat can deter the authentic luxury brand from selling on the online marketplace. Furthermore, by comparing our equilibrium outcome with the benchmark case where the authentic luxury brand does not consider selling on the online marketplace at all, we show that the authentic luxury brand’s potential entry to the online marketplace is sufficient to induce the copycat to improve its quality and lower its price, thereby improving the aggregate consumer surplus. In addition, the online marketplace can always be better off allowing the entry of the copycat if there is no external enforcement against copycats. We show that our key results are valid in various extensions and they offer multiple managerial implications. 2022-12-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7151 info:doi/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.11.053 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8150/viewcontent/SSRN_id4289205.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University supply chain management conspicuous consumption copycats online marketplace channel strategy Marketing Operations and Supply Chain Management
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic supply chain management
conspicuous consumption
copycats
online marketplace
channel strategy
Marketing
Operations and Supply Chain Management
spellingShingle supply chain management
conspicuous consumption
copycats
online marketplace
channel strategy
Marketing
Operations and Supply Chain Management
GAO, Sarah Yini
LIM, Wei Shi
YE, Ziqiu
Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats
description The strategic interaction between authentic luxury brands and their copycats has evolved since the proliferation of online marketplaces. Using a game-theoretic framework, we examine how an authentic luxury brand, observing the strategic behavior of its competing copycats, should make its optimal entry decision to a third-party online marketplace. Our findings reveal that the authentic luxury brand does not sell on the online marketplace when either the quality or the physical resemblance of the copycat to the authentic luxury brand is high. This contributes to the related literature by offering an explanation for the increasing quality of copycats amid the e-commerce boom —improving the quality of the copycat can deter the authentic luxury brand from selling on the online marketplace. Furthermore, by comparing our equilibrium outcome with the benchmark case where the authentic luxury brand does not consider selling on the online marketplace at all, we show that the authentic luxury brand’s potential entry to the online marketplace is sufficient to induce the copycat to improve its quality and lower its price, thereby improving the aggregate consumer surplus. In addition, the online marketplace can always be better off allowing the entry of the copycat if there is no external enforcement against copycats. We show that our key results are valid in various extensions and they offer multiple managerial implications.
format text
author GAO, Sarah Yini
LIM, Wei Shi
YE, Ziqiu
author_facet GAO, Sarah Yini
LIM, Wei Shi
YE, Ziqiu
author_sort GAO, Sarah Yini
title Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats
title_short Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats
title_full Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats
title_fullStr Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats
title_full_unstemmed Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats
title_sort optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2022
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7151
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8150/viewcontent/SSRN_id4289205.pdf
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