Iterated Weaker-than-Weak Dominance
We introduce a weakening of standard gametheoretic δ-dominance conditions, called dominance, which enables more aggressive pruning of candidate strategies at the cost of solution accuracy. Equilibria of a game obtained by eliminating a δ-dominated strategy are guaranteed to be approximate equilibria...
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Main Authors: | CHENG, Shih-Fen, WELLMAN, Michael P. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2007
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/840 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1839/viewcontent/IJCAI_ChengS1471.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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