Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.

Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.

We compare two mechanisms from the buyer’s perspective in multi-attribute supply procurement, with verifiable and unverifiable quality of the supplies and risk aversion to deviation from acceptable quality: an auction mechanism and a generalized Nash bargaining mechanism. We develop a model to repre...

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Main Authors: Huang, H., Xu, H., KAUFFMAN, Robert John, Sun, N.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
Subjects:
Auctions
Bargaining
E-procurement
Mechanism design
Quality
Risk
Computer Sciences
E-Commerce
Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2728
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
id sg-smu-ink.sis_research-3728
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-37282015-11-12T01:54:06Z Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion. Huang, H. Xu, H. KAUFFMAN, Robert John Sun, N. We compare two mechanisms from the buyer’s perspective in multi-attribute supply procurement, with verifiable and unverifiable quality of the supplies and risk aversion to deviation from acceptable quality: an auction mechanism and a generalized Nash bargaining mechanism. We develop a model to represent the effects on the buyer’s dominant strategy of bargaining and auction participation. The results suggest the conditions for which bargaining is preferred over the auction mechanism alone. 2013-07-01T07:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2728 info:doi/10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.003 Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Auctions Bargaining E-procurement Mechanism design Quality Risk Computer Sciences E-Commerce Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Auctions
Bargaining
E-procurement
Mechanism design
Quality
Risk
Computer Sciences
E-Commerce
Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering
spellingShingle Auctions
Bargaining
E-procurement
Mechanism design
Quality
Risk
Computer Sciences
E-Commerce
Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering
Huang, H.
Xu, H.
KAUFFMAN, Robert John
Sun, N.
Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.
description We compare two mechanisms from the buyer’s perspective in multi-attribute supply procurement, with verifiable and unverifiable quality of the supplies and risk aversion to deviation from acceptable quality: an auction mechanism and a generalized Nash bargaining mechanism. We develop a model to represent the effects on the buyer’s dominant strategy of bargaining and auction participation. The results suggest the conditions for which bargaining is preferred over the auction mechanism alone.
format text
author Huang, H.
Xu, H.
KAUFFMAN, Robert John
Sun, N.
author_facet Huang, H.
Xu, H.
KAUFFMAN, Robert John
Sun, N.
author_sort Huang, H.
title Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.
title_short Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.
title_full Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.
title_fullStr Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.
title_full_unstemmed Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.
title_sort analyzing auction and bargaining mechanism design in e-procurement with quality verification and risk aversion.
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2013
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2728
_version_ 1770572597253111808

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