Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Huang, H., Xu, H., KAUFFMAN, Robert John, Sun, N.
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
• الموضوعات: Auctions; Bargaining; E-procurement; Mechanism design; Quality; Risk; Computer Sciences; E-Commerce; Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2728
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

We compare two mechanisms from the buyer’s perspective in multi-attribute supply procurement, with verifiable and unverifiable quality of the supplies and risk aversion to deviation from acceptable quality: an auction mechanism and a generalized Nash bargaining mechanism. We develop a model to repre...