Empirical Design of Incentive Mechanisms in Group-Buying Auctions: Chapter 8

Empirical Design of Incentive Mechanisms in Group-Buying Auctions: Chapter 8

Experimental methodologies offer a unique lens through which to examine the dynamics of bidding behavior and consumer perceptions of the efficacy of mechanism design in group-buying auctions. Group-buying auctions permit participating consumers to leverage their numbers to achieve discounted prices f...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: DOONG, Her-Sen, KAUFFMAN, Robert J., LAI, Hsiangchu, ZHUANG, Ya-Ting
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
Subjects:
Auction markets
group-buying auctions
incentive mechanisms
price curve effects
procurement
Information technology
Economic aspects
Electronic commerce
Computer Sciences
Management Information Systems
Sales and Merchandising
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2836
https://worldcat.org/isbn/9780765615329
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2836
https://worldcat.org/isbn/9780765615329

Similar Items