Empirical Design of Incentive Mechanisms in Group-Buying Auctions: Chapter 8
Experimental methodologies offer a unique lens through which to examine the dynamics of bidding behavior and consumer perceptions of the efficacy of mechanism design in group-buying auctions. Group-buying auctions permit participating consumers to leverage their numbers to achieve discounted prices f...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | DOONG, Her-Sen, KAUFFMAN, Robert J., LAI, Hsiangchu, ZHUANG, Ya-Ting |
---|---|
Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2009
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2836 https://worldcat.org/isbn/9780765615329 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
Similar Items
-
Incentive Mechanisms, Fairness and Participation in Group-Buying Auctions
by: KAUFFMAN, Robert J., et al.
Published: (2010) -
Sequential auctions with decreasing reserve prices.
by: LANDI, Massimiliano, et al.
Published: (2018) -
Should We Collude? Analyzing the Benefits of Bidder Cooperation in Group-Buying Auctions.
by: Chen, J., et al.
Published: (2009) -
Mechanism Design for E-Procurement Auctions: On the Efficacy of Post-Auction Negotiation and Quality Effort Incentives
by: Huang, H., et al.
Published: (2011) -
Online auction models and empirical results
by: GE HONG
Published: (2010)