Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts

We examine how executives’ ability to control their firm’s exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. We use the introduction of exchanged-traded weather derivatives, which improved executives’ ability to control their firms’ exposure to weather risk, as a natural...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: ARMSTRONG, Christopher, GLAESER, Stephen, HUANG, Sterling
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1866
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2893&context=soa_research
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
id sg-smu-ink.soa_research-2893
record_format dspace
spelling sg-smu-ink.soa_research-28932020-06-04T08:25:41Z Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts ARMSTRONG, Christopher GLAESER, Stephen HUANG, Sterling We examine how executives’ ability to control their firm’s exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. We use the introduction of exchanged-traded weather derivatives, which improved executives’ ability to control their firms’ exposure to weather risk, as a natural experiment. We find that executives for whom weather derivatives have the greatest impact on their ability to control their firm’s exposure to weather risk experience relative reductions in total compensation and equity incentives. The former finding is consistent with a reduction in the risk premium that executives receive for their exposure to weather risk. The latter finding suggests that risk and incentives are complements when executives can control their firms’ exposure to risk. Collectively, our results show that executives’ ability to control their firms’ exposure to risk alters the nature of agency conflicts and influences the design of their incentivecompensation contracts. 2019-07-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1866 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2893&context=soa_research http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Accountancy eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University executive compensation contract design equity incentives risk-taking incentives stock options derivatives hedging natural experiment Accounting
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
country Singapore
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic executive compensation
contract design
equity incentives
risk-taking incentives
stock options
derivatives
hedging
natural experiment
Accounting
spellingShingle executive compensation
contract design
equity incentives
risk-taking incentives
stock options
derivatives
hedging
natural experiment
Accounting
ARMSTRONG, Christopher
GLAESER, Stephen
HUANG, Sterling
Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts
description We examine how executives’ ability to control their firm’s exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. We use the introduction of exchanged-traded weather derivatives, which improved executives’ ability to control their firms’ exposure to weather risk, as a natural experiment. We find that executives for whom weather derivatives have the greatest impact on their ability to control their firm’s exposure to weather risk experience relative reductions in total compensation and equity incentives. The former finding is consistent with a reduction in the risk premium that executives receive for their exposure to weather risk. The latter finding suggests that risk and incentives are complements when executives can control their firms’ exposure to risk. Collectively, our results show that executives’ ability to control their firms’ exposure to risk alters the nature of agency conflicts and influences the design of their incentivecompensation contracts.
format text
author ARMSTRONG, Christopher
GLAESER, Stephen
HUANG, Sterling
author_facet ARMSTRONG, Christopher
GLAESER, Stephen
HUANG, Sterling
author_sort ARMSTRONG, Christopher
title Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts
title_short Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts
title_full Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts
title_fullStr Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts
title_full_unstemmed Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts
title_sort controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2019
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1866
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2893&context=soa_research
_version_ 1681136204772278272