Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts
We examine how executives’ ability to control their firm’s exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. We use the introduction of exchanged-traded weather derivatives, which improved executives’ ability to control their firms’ exposure to weather risk, as a natural...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1866 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2893&context=soa_research |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
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