L S Penrose's Limit Theorem: Tests by simulation
L S Penrose's Limit Theorem-which is implicit in Penrose (1952, p. 72) [Penrose, 1952. On the Objective Study of Crowd Behavior. H. K. Lewis and Co, London, p. 72] and for which he gave no rigorous proof-says that, in simple weighted voting games, if the number of voters increases indefinitely...
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Main Authors: | Chang, Pao Li, Chua, Vincent, MACHOVER, Moshe |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2006
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/186 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1185/viewcontent/VCMMR_2006_pp.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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