The Case of the Errant Executive: Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating

• المؤلف الرئيسي: GUHA, Brishti
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2005
• الموضوعات: Moral hazard; firm size; managerial compensation; repeated games; Behavioral Economics; Economics
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/859; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1858/viewcontent/errantexecutive.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

Firm insiders – a manager and a board – face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders in a repeated game with asymmetric information and stochastic market outcomes. The manager determines whether or not outsiders are cheated; the board, whose objectives differ from those of outside sha...