Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting

In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitelyrepeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agent’s information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: LEE, Gea Myoung
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2008
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1027
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2026/viewcontent/Optimal_Collusion_with_Internal_Contracting2009.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English