Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting
In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitelyrepeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agent’s information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of pr...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2008
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1027 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2026/viewcontent/Optimal_Collusion_with_Internal_Contracting2009.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |