Advertising Collusion in Retail Markets

Advertising Collusion in Retail Markets

We analyze non-price advertising by retail firms, when the firms are privately informed about their respective costs of production. In a static advertising game, an advertising equilibrium exists in which lower-cost firms select higher advertising levels. In this equilibrium, informed consumers rati...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: BAGWELL, Kyle, LEE, Gea M.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2010
Subjects:
advertising
collusion
private information
retail markets
Advertising and Promotion Management
Behavioral Economics
Industrial Organization
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1173
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2172/viewcontent/bejeap.2010.10.1.2489.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1173
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2172/viewcontent/bejeap.2010.10.1.2489.pdf

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