Advertising and Collusion in Retail Markets

Advertising and Collusion in Retail Markets

We consider non-price advertising by retail firms that are privately informed as to their respective production costs. We first analyze a static model. We construct an advertising equilibrium, in which informed consumers use an advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising fi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: BAGWELL, Kyle, LEE, Gea Myoung
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2008
Subjects:
advertising
collusion
private information
retail markets
Advertising and Promotion Management
Behavioral Economics
Industrial Organization
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1112
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2111/viewcontent/Advertising__Collusion.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1112
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2111/viewcontent/Advertising__Collusion.pdf

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