Advertising and Collusion in Retail Markets
We consider non-price advertising by retail firms that are privately informed as to their respective production costs. We first analyze a static model. We construct an advertising equilibrium, in which informed consumers use an advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising fi...
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Main Authors: | BAGWELL, Kyle, LEE, Gea Myoung |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2008
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1112 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2111/viewcontent/Advertising__Collusion.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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