To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis

In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents’ intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain thi...

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主要作者: HUANG, Fali
格式: text
語言:English
出版: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2007
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在線閱讀:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1029
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2028/viewcontent/TrustGovernance20070924ET.pdf
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機構: Singapore Management University
語言: English