Inefficient Worker Turnover
This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers’ mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homogeneous and their true productivity is learnt...
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2007
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| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1057 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2056/viewcontent/IWTNLJacquet.pdf |
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-20562019-04-27T06:00:41Z Inefficient Worker Turnover JACQUET, Nicolas L. This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers’ mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homogeneous and their true productivity is learnt after the match is formed. It is shown that the efficiency of worker turnover depends on contract enforceability, and that in the absence of complete enforceability the equilibrium fails to be efficient. This is because without complete enforceability firms cannot credibly offer workers contracts that will guarantee them the entire future of all potential future matches. 2007-09-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1057 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2056/viewcontent/IWTNLJacquet.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University On-the-Job Search Learning Bargaining Contracts Enforceability. Labor Economics |
| institution |
Singapore Management University |
| building |
SMU Libraries |
| continent |
Asia |
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Singapore Singapore |
| content_provider |
SMU Libraries |
| collection |
InK@SMU |
| language |
English |
| topic |
On-the-Job Search Learning Bargaining Contracts Enforceability. Labor Economics |
| spellingShingle |
On-the-Job Search Learning Bargaining Contracts Enforceability. Labor Economics JACQUET, Nicolas L. Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| description |
This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers’ mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homogeneous and their true productivity is learnt after the match is formed. It is shown that the efficiency of worker turnover depends on contract enforceability, and that in the absence of complete enforceability the equilibrium fails to be efficient. This is because without complete enforceability firms cannot credibly offer workers contracts that will guarantee them the entire future of all potential future matches. |
| format |
text |
| author |
JACQUET, Nicolas L. |
| author_facet |
JACQUET, Nicolas L. |
| author_sort |
JACQUET, Nicolas L. |
| title |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_short |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_full |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_fullStr |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_sort |
inefficient worker turnover |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
2007 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1057 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2056/viewcontent/IWTNLJacquet.pdf |
| _version_ |
1770569386268033024 |