Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas
Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate pir...
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2011
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-23332020-01-14T06:26:19Z Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy. 2011-05-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1334 info:doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.01.030 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2333/viewcontent/PiratesTradersEconomicsSea_2011.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Piracy Violent crime Economies of scale Penalties Moral hazard Selfinsurance Behavioral Economics |
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Piracy Violent crime Economies of scale Penalties Moral hazard Selfinsurance Behavioral Economics |
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Piracy Violent crime Economies of scale Penalties Moral hazard Selfinsurance Behavioral Economics GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas |
| description |
Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy. |
| format |
text |
| author |
GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. |
| author_facet |
GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. |
| author_sort |
GUHA, Brishti |
| title |
Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas |
| title_short |
Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas |
| title_full |
Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas |
| title_fullStr |
Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas |
| title_sort |
pirates and traders: some economics of pirate-infested seas |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
2011 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1334 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2333/viewcontent/PiratesTradersEconomicsSea_2011.pdf |
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