Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas

Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas

Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate pir...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: GUHA, Brishti, GUHA, Ashok S.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2011
Subjects:
Piracy
Violent crime
Economies of scale
Penalties
Moral hazard
Selfinsurance
Behavioral Economics
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1334
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2333/viewcontent/PiratesTradersEconomicsSea_2011.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1334
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2333/viewcontent/PiratesTradersEconomicsSea_2011.pdf

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