Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas
Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate pir...
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Main Authors: | GUHA, Brishti, GUHA, Ashok S. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2011
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1334 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2333/viewcontent/PiratesTradersEconomicsSea_2011.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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