Inefficiency in the Shadow of Unobservable Outside Options

This paper considers the problem of allocating an object between two players in an environment with one sided asymmetric information when their outside options depend on each other's type, causing the outside option of the uninformed player to be unobservable to her. Consequently efficient mech...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: ANEY, Madhav S.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2012
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1401
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2400/viewcontent/28_2012_second_best_inefficiency.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
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