Inefficiency in the Shadow of Unobservable Outside Options
This paper considers the problem of allocating an object between two players in an environment with one sided asymmetric information when their outside options depend on each other's type, causing the outside option of the uninformed player to be unobservable to her. Consequently efficient mech...
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Main Author: | ANEY, Madhav S. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1401 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2400/viewcontent/28_2012_second_best_inefficiency.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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