Expropriation risk and competition with the military
How can agents in the military, who control the means of coercion, commit not to expropriate from producers? In this paper we propose competition within the military as one of the mechanisms that can deter predation and consequently create commitment. In our model, even if agents within the military...
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Main Authors: | ANEY, Madhav S., KO, Giovanni |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1696 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2695/viewcontent/MSAney_GKo_military_competition_expropriation.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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