Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine

Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine

We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socia...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: ARTEMOV, Georgy, KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SERRANO, Roberto
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
Subjects:
Wilson doctrine
Mechanism
design
Robust virtual implementation
Δ-rationalizability
Incentive compatibility
Measurability
Type diversity
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2002
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3001/viewcontent/RobustVirtualImplementation_2012_JET.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
Description
Summary:We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out. In environments allowing small transfers of utility among agents, these two conditions are also sufficient.

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