Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions

Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions

We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is nondecreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt is dominant strategy in private value models an...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil, CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SEN, Arunava
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2003
Subjects:
dominant strategy
ex post incentive compatibility
multi-unit auctions
Economic Theory
Strategic Management Policy
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2022
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3021/viewcontent/pdf_SB13.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2022
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3021/viewcontent/pdf_SB13.pdf

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