Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions
We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is nondecreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt is dominant strategy in private value models an...
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Main Authors: | BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil, CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SEN, Arunava |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2003
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2022 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3021/viewcontent/pdf_SB13.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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