Implementation with transfers

Implementation with transfers

We say that a social choice rule is implementable with (small) transfers if one candesign a mechanism whose set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that speciÖed bythe rule but the mechanism allows for (small) ex post transfers among the players. Weshow in private-value environments that any ince...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHEN, Yi-Chun, KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SUN, Yifei
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
Subjects:
Continuous implementation
full implementation
incentive compatibility
robustness
transfers
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2060
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3059/viewcontent/ISER_Seminar_20160705.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2060
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3059/viewcontent/ISER_Seminar_20160705.pdf

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