Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information

Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information

Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study amechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the setof first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)) and show that Δ-incentivecomp...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: KUNIMOTO, Takashi
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
Subjects:
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first-order belief
incentive compatibility
measurability
robust virtual implementation
rationalizable strategies
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2073
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3072/viewcontent/RVI_almost_complete_Oct2013.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2073
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3072/viewcontent/RVI_almost_complete_Oct2013.pdf

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