Harmful transparency in teams
In a two-player team project with efforts over two rounds, we demonstrate that observability of peer efforts can be strictly harmful if preferences are utilitarian. This contrasts with Mohnen et al. (2000) who show in a similar setting that observability of interim efforts induces more efforts, if t...
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2016
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-33182023-10-19T00:36:11Z Harmful transparency in teams BAG, Parimal PEPITO, Nona In a two-player team project with efforts over two rounds, we demonstrate that observability of peer efforts can be strictly harmful if preferences are utilitarian. This contrasts with Mohnen et al. (2000) who show in a similar setting that observability of interim efforts induces more efforts, if team members are inequity-averse. 2016-05-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2319 info:doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.005 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3318/viewcontent/EL39857_finalversion.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University transparency team perfect substitution free-riding Behavioral Economics |
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transparency team perfect substitution free-riding Behavioral Economics |
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transparency team perfect substitution free-riding Behavioral Economics BAG, Parimal PEPITO, Nona Harmful transparency in teams |
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In a two-player team project with efforts over two rounds, we demonstrate that observability of peer efforts can be strictly harmful if preferences are utilitarian. This contrasts with Mohnen et al. (2000) who show in a similar setting that observability of interim efforts induces more efforts, if team members are inequity-averse. |
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text |
| author |
BAG, Parimal PEPITO, Nona |
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BAG, Parimal PEPITO, Nona |
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BAG, Parimal |
| title |
Harmful transparency in teams |
| title_short |
Harmful transparency in teams |
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Harmful transparency in teams |
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Harmful transparency in teams |
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Harmful transparency in teams |
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harmful transparency in teams |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2319 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3318/viewcontent/EL39857_finalversion.pdf |
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