Harmful transparency in teams
In a two-player team project with efforts over two rounds, we demonstrate that observability of peer efforts can be strictly harmful if preferences are utilitarian. This contrasts with Mohnen et al. (2000) who show in a similar setting that observability of interim efforts induces more efforts, if t...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2319 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3318/viewcontent/EL39857_finalversion.pdf |
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| 機構: | Singapore Management University |
| 語言: | English |