A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
Acelebrated result in the theory of tournaments is that relative performance evaluation (tournaments) is a superior compensation method to absolute performance evaluation (piece rate contracts) when the agents are risk-averse, the principal is risk-neutral or less risk-averse than the agents and pro...
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Main Authors: | MARINAKIS, Kosmas, TSOULOUHAS, Theofanis |
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2344 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3343/viewcontent/Marinakis_Tsoulouhas2012_Article_AComparisonOfCardinalTournamen.pdf |
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機構: | Singapore Management University |
語言: | English |
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