Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: Comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
This paper first considers a bilateral-trade model with one-sided asymmetric information in which one agent (seller) initially owns an indivisible object and is fully informed of its value, while the other agent (buyer) intends to obtain the object whose value is unknown to himself. As no mechanisms...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2022
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| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2660 |
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