A robust optimization approach to mechanism design
We study the design of mechanisms when the mechanism designer faces local uncertainty about agents’ beliefs. Specifically, we consider a designer who does not know the exact beliefs of the agents but is confident that her estimate is within ϵ of the beliefs held by the agents (where ϵ reflects the d...
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Main Authors: | LI, Jiangtao, WANG, Kexin |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2024
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2765 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3764/viewcontent/RobustBayesian.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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