On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids
© 2015, Newswood Ltd. All rights reseved. This study focuses on the lowest unique sealed-bid auctions in which the winning bidder is the one who places the unique bid that has the lowest value where exactly m bids per bidder are allowed. The problem can be seen as injecting a minimum into a random s...
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th-cmuir.6653943832-544902018-09-04T10:14:46Z On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids Nawapon Nakharutai Parkpoom Phetpradap Engineering © 2015, Newswood Ltd. All rights reseved. This study focuses on the lowest unique sealed-bid auctions in which the winning bidder is the one who places the unique bid that has the lowest value where exactly m bids per bidder are allowed. The problem can be seen as injecting a minimum into a random subset of a larger subset. By assuming that bids are identical and independently placed according to a given probability distribution, we obtain various exact probabilities for the auctions, both as a bidder and an observer, for m = 1, 2. The results are obtained via the inclusion- exclusion principle. The computational results and algorithms to calculate the probabilities are also given. 2018-09-04T10:14:46Z 2018-09-04T10:14:46Z 2015-07-10 Journal 18160948 1816093X 2-s2.0-84955591431 https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84955591431&origin=inward http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/54490 |
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Chiang Mai University |
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Chiang Mai University Library |
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Thailand |
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Engineering |
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Engineering Nawapon Nakharutai Parkpoom Phetpradap On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids |
| description |
© 2015, Newswood Ltd. All rights reseved. This study focuses on the lowest unique sealed-bid auctions in which the winning bidder is the one who places the unique bid that has the lowest value where exactly m bids per bidder are allowed. The problem can be seen as injecting a minimum into a random subset of a larger subset. By assuming that bids are identical and independently placed according to a given probability distribution, we obtain various exact probabilities for the auctions, both as a bidder and an observer, for m = 1, 2. The results are obtained via the inclusion- exclusion principle. The computational results and algorithms to calculate the probabilities are also given. |
| format |
Journal |
| author |
Nawapon Nakharutai Parkpoom Phetpradap |
| author_facet |
Nawapon Nakharutai Parkpoom Phetpradap |
| author_sort |
Nawapon Nakharutai |
| title |
On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids |
| title_short |
On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids |
| title_full |
On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids |
| title_fullStr |
On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids |
| title_full_unstemmed |
On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids |
| title_sort |
on the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids |
| publishDate |
2018 |
| url |
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84955591431&origin=inward http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/54490 |
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