On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids
© 2015, Newswood Ltd. All rights reseved. This study focuses on the lowest unique sealed-bid auctions in which the winning bidder is the one who places the unique bid that has the lowest value where exactly m bids per bidder are allowed. The problem can be seen as injecting a minimum into a random s...
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Main Authors: | Nawapon Nakharutai, Parkpoom Phetpradap |
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Format: | Journal |
Published: |
2018
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84955591431&origin=inward http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/54490 |
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Institution: | Chiang Mai University |
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