Entry coordination and auction design with private costs of information acquisition
10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00216.x
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Main Author: | Lu, J. |
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Other Authors: | ECONOMICS |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
2011
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Online Access: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/22360 |
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Institution: | National University of Singapore |
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