Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies
10.1007/s00199-020-01318-5
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Main Authors: | Hammond, Peter J., Qiao, Lei, Sun, Yeneng |
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Other Authors: | DEAN'S OFFICE (SCIENCE) |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
2022
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/232615 |
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Institution: | National University of Singapore |
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