The Two Faces of Control: Network Closure and Individual Performance among Knowledge Workers

This paper argues that the effect of dense social ties, or network closure, on a knowledge worker's performance depends on the predominant role this worker plays with his or her exchange partners in the relationships affected by that closure. Using data on informal exchanges among investment ba...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: GARGIULO, Martin, ERTUG, Gokhan, GALUNIC, Charles
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/1280
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/2279/viewcontent/Gargiulo_Ertug_Galunic_2009_ASQ__2_.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
id sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-2279
record_format dspace
spelling sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-22792020-01-08T05:33:40Z The Two Faces of Control: Network Closure and Individual Performance among Knowledge Workers GARGIULO, Martin ERTUG, Gokhan GALUNIC, Charles This paper argues that the effect of dense social ties, or network closure, on a knowledge worker's performance depends on the predominant role this worker plays with his or her exchange partners in the relationships affected by that closure. Using data on informal exchanges among investment bankers in the equities division of a large financial services firm operating in Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the Americas in 2001, we find that network closure in relationships in which the banker acts as an acquirer of information increases his or her performance, whereas closure in relationships in which the banker acts as a provider of information decreases it. We also find that these effects are moderated by the bankers' ability to employ alternative means (such as formal authority) to induce the cooperation of exchange partners in their acquirer role, as well as by the extent to which the bankers can benefit from being free from the control of exchange partners in their provider role. Our findings highlight the two sides of the normative control associated with network closure: control benefits people when they need to induce exchange partners to behave according to their preferences, but it hurts them when it forces them to behave according to the preferences of those partners. 2009-06-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/1280 info:doi/10.2189/asqu.2009.54.2.299 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/2279/viewcontent/Gargiulo_Ertug_Galunic_2009_ASQ__2_.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Human Resources Management Organizational Behavior and Theory Strategic Management Policy
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Human Resources Management
Organizational Behavior and Theory
Strategic Management Policy
spellingShingle Human Resources Management
Organizational Behavior and Theory
Strategic Management Policy
GARGIULO, Martin
ERTUG, Gokhan
GALUNIC, Charles
The Two Faces of Control: Network Closure and Individual Performance among Knowledge Workers
description This paper argues that the effect of dense social ties, or network closure, on a knowledge worker's performance depends on the predominant role this worker plays with his or her exchange partners in the relationships affected by that closure. Using data on informal exchanges among investment bankers in the equities division of a large financial services firm operating in Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the Americas in 2001, we find that network closure in relationships in which the banker acts as an acquirer of information increases his or her performance, whereas closure in relationships in which the banker acts as a provider of information decreases it. We also find that these effects are moderated by the bankers' ability to employ alternative means (such as formal authority) to induce the cooperation of exchange partners in their acquirer role, as well as by the extent to which the bankers can benefit from being free from the control of exchange partners in their provider role. Our findings highlight the two sides of the normative control associated with network closure: control benefits people when they need to induce exchange partners to behave according to their preferences, but it hurts them when it forces them to behave according to the preferences of those partners.
format text
author GARGIULO, Martin
ERTUG, Gokhan
GALUNIC, Charles
author_facet GARGIULO, Martin
ERTUG, Gokhan
GALUNIC, Charles
author_sort GARGIULO, Martin
title The Two Faces of Control: Network Closure and Individual Performance among Knowledge Workers
title_short The Two Faces of Control: Network Closure and Individual Performance among Knowledge Workers
title_full The Two Faces of Control: Network Closure and Individual Performance among Knowledge Workers
title_fullStr The Two Faces of Control: Network Closure and Individual Performance among Knowledge Workers
title_full_unstemmed The Two Faces of Control: Network Closure and Individual Performance among Knowledge Workers
title_sort two faces of control: network closure and individual performance among knowledge workers
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2009
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/1280
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/2279/viewcontent/Gargiulo_Ertug_Galunic_2009_ASQ__2_.pdf
_version_ 1770569858696609792