Do Poison Pills Increase Firm Risk?
Management scholars have argued that an active takeover market discourages risk-taking by managers and that takeover defenses serve to counter the risk-reducing pressures of an active takeover market. This study employs the Black and Scholes Option Pricing Model to determine whether or not adoption...
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Main Authors: | TURK, Thomas, GOH, Jeremy C., YBARRA, Candace |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2008
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5046 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6045/viewcontent/10_22495_cocv5i3p5.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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