Profit-Maximizing Incentive for Participatory Sensing

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: LUO, Tie, TAN, Hwee-Pink, XIA, Lirong
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
• الموضوعات: Bayesian game; Mechanism design; all-pay auction; crowd-sensing; network economics; perturbation analysis; Software Engineering
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2937; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3937/viewcontent/infocom2014.pdf

We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing. The organizer (principal) aims to attract a high amount of contribution from participating users (agents) while at the same time lowering his payout, which we formulate as a profit-maximization problem. We use a co...