Optimal Prizes for All-Pay Contests in Heterogeneous Crowdsourcing

• Main Authors: T. Luo, S. Kanhere, S. Das, TAN, Hwee-Pink
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
• Subjects: Incentive mechanism; all-pay auction; asymmetric contest; network economics; participatory sensing; strategy autonomy; Computer Sciences
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2941; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3941/viewcontent/mass2014.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

Incentive is key to the success of crowd sourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowd sourcing campaigns. We cast the problem in a new, asymmetric all-pay conte...