Partial adversarial behavior deception in security games
Learning attacker behavior is an important research topic in security games as security agencies are often uncertain about attackers’ decision making. Previous work has focused on developing various behavioral models of attackers based on historical attack data. However, a clever attacker can manipu...
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Main Authors: | NGUYEN, Thanh H., SINHA, Arunesh, HE, He |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2021
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5534 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/6537/viewcontent/IJCAI2020_AdversarialBehavior_1___2_.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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