Ex Ante Randomization in Agency Models
In a principal-agent relationship, the principal tries to develop a sharing rule that both motivates the agent and shares risk. In examining the use of randomized strategies in the structuring of optimal contracts in agency settings, ex post randomization (over fee schedules following act selection...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
1984
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| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/730 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555682 |
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