Corporate Hedging and the Design of Incentive-Compensation Contracts
We use the introduction of exchange-traded weather derivative contracts as a natural experiment to examine the relation between risk and incentives. In particular, we examine how executives’ ability to hedge uncontrollable weather-related risk that was previously difficult and costly to manage influ...
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Main Authors: | ARMSTRONG, Chris, Sterling HUANG |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1520 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2547&context=soa_research |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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