Applicant Screening and Performance-Related Outcomes
A fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most economic models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to screen job...
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Main Authors: | HUANG, Fali, Cappelli, Peter |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2010
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/5 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1004/viewcontent/EmployeeScreening2009_12.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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