Strategy Meets Evolution: Games Suppliers and Producers Play
Final goods producers, who may be intrinsically honest (a behavioral type) or opportunistic (strategic), play a repeated game of imperfect information with suppliers of an input of variable (and non-verifiable) quality. Returns to cheating are increasing in the proportion of intrinsically honest pro...
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Main Author: | GUHA, Brishti |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2006
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/870 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1869/viewcontent/Paper_06_2006.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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