"Inferiority" Complex? Policing, Private Precautions and Crime
I link the idea that greater state policing induces private neglect of safety precautions (moral hazard) with the concept of “inferior inputs” in the production function literature. I model crime prevention as an outcome of two “inputs”—policing (a public good) and private security expenses. I show...
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Main Author: | GUHA, Brishti |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1508 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9408-x |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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