Interim equilibrium implementation

• Main Author: KUNIMOTO, Takashi
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
• Subjects: closure; convex range property; implementation; interim equilibrium; interim incentive compatibility; interim equilibrium monotonicity; intersection property; Nash implementation; no-worst-rule condition; social choice set; Economic Theory
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2072; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3071/viewcontent/interim_equilibrium_implementation_March2014.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

A social choice rule is said to be implementable if one can design a mechanism(or institution) in which the set of outcomes prescribed by a given solutionconcept coincides with that specified by the social choice rule. I adoptinterim equilibrium (i.e., Bayesian Nash equilibrium where each agent’s interimbeliefs do not necessarily admit a prior) as the solution concept andinvestigate the corresponding implementation problem in general incompleteinformation environments. I identify arguably the weakest set of conditionsunder which implementation in interim equilibrium is possible. By doingso, I also unify the literature of the so-called Bayesian implementation andNash implementation.