Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2259 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3258/viewcontent/Random_Mechanism_Design_on_Multidimensional_Domains.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a particular class of top-separable domains: connected domains, and show that in the class of minimally rich and connected domains, the multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the design of a flexible random social choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof. Such a flexible function is distinct from generalized random dictatorships in that it allows for a systematic notion of compromise. Our characterization remains valid (under an additional hypothesis) for a problem of voting with constraints where not all alternatives are feasible (Barbera et al., 1997). |
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