Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains

Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains

We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, ZENG, Huaxia
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
Subjects:
Generalized random dictatorships
Top-separability
Separability
Multidimensional single-peakedness
Connected+ domains
Voting under constraints
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2259
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3258/viewcontent/Random_Mechanism_Design_on_Multidimensional_Domains.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2259
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3258/viewcontent/Random_Mechanism_Design_on_Multidimensional_Domains.pdf

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