Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, ZENG, Huaxia
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
• الموضوعات: Generalized random dictatorships; Top-separability; Separability; Multidimensional single-peakedness; Connected+ domains; Voting under constraints; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2259; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3258/viewcontent/Random_Mechanism_Design_on_Multidimensional_Domains.pdf

We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion...